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Summary: This paper brings together the work of Jacques Lacan, the great Christianizer 
of psychoanalysis, and René Girard, the speculative anthropologist whose study of 
sacrifice and myth led not only to his rejection of Freud and Lacan but a dramatic 
conversion to Catholicism and growing conviction as to the revelatory power of the 
Gospels to expose the myth upon which psychoanalysis is built. Despite their antipathy I 
bring a psychoanalytic perspective to bear on Girard's theory, interrogating the modalities 
of sacrifice according Lacan's three registers of the psyche: the imaginary, symbolic, and 
real. I then explore Girard's distinction between myth and Gospel in light of Lacan's claim 
regarding the impossibility of the sexual relation. I argue that the difference between 
sacrifice in the register of the symbolic, and sacrifice in the register of the real not only 
restages the impossibility of the sexual relation, it conforms to Girard's distinction 
between myth and Gospel. In this way I pave the way for a more mutual reading of their 
enterprises, and theology and psychoanalysis more generally. 
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Introduction 
  
Born in Avignon in 1923, René Girard has spent most of his life in 
America where he has taught and undertaken research across a range 
of disciplines including literary criticism, historiography, comparative 
religion, anthropology and psychoanalysis. He was central in 
promoting critical theory in America. In 1966 he organized the epoch-
making International Symposium The Structuralist Controversy: The 
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (Macksey & Donato, 
1972), which brought together for the first time for an American 
audience many of the leading figures of European structuralism 
including: Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Eugenio Donato, Jean 
Hyppolite, Jacques Lacan, Georges Poulet, and Jean-Pierre Vernant 
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amongst others. It was at this symposium that Derrida first delivered 
his seminal "La Structure, le signe, et le jeu dans le discours des 
sciences humaines", and Lacan would meet Lévi-Strauss for the first 
time (the two were formally introduced by Girard). But it was Girard's 
work concerning Christianity, sacrifice and violence, which brought 
him to international acclaim. Against the post-modern trend to 
disregard God and grand theorizing he made the argument for a 
universal anthropological theory of mimesis, violence and sacrifice to 
which the Gospels offered an exceptional alternative: mimetic desire 
breeds competition and hence potential violence which is only kept in 
check through a scapegoat mechanism; in the Gospels, God's 
identification with the innocence of the victim (i.e., Christ) brings that 
mechanism into full view for the first time. It's a simple theory yet one 
which yields extraordinary explanatory power. Girard arrived at this 
theory through a critical investigation of literary and religious texts, 
which contributed to his dramatic conversion at the age of 35 to 
Catholicism, and growing conviction as to the revelatory power of the 
Gospels to expose the foundations of violence and sacrifice through 
the mimetic order. All of this lends, as Maurizio Meloni (2002) notes, 
a profound social basis to his view of Christianity: in Girard's work, 
Christianity is not to be taken as a matter of personnel belief, nor does 
he simply employ the symbols of Christianity to give a certain tenor to 
his anthropology; rather,  Christianity reveals something unique which 
becomes the foundation for a social anthropology and psychology.  
In this latter regard, the work of Freud and Lacan has been a 
significant point of departure for Girard – often utilizing their insights 
whilst transforming them along gospel lines – he was nonetheless led 
to reject psychoanalysis, and in particular its sexual bias: what matters 
is not sex but the violence of the victimage mechanism that ensues 
from mimetic desire. From a Girardian perspective the psychoanalytic 
unveiling of religious myth masks a deeper complicity with the 
victimage mechanism and hence constitutes in his terms mythical 
thinking, such that in the final analysis it is psychoanalysis that 
remains within myth and Christianity alone which offers Gospel truth. 
In this paper I wish to elaborate and explore more fully the relation 
between Girard and Lacan's thought, myth, Gospel, and the sexual 
relation. It is not my intention to pit the claims of one against the 
other; nor do I intend to systematically draw out their dual heritage or 
dependence in the work of prior theorists such as Alexandre Kojève 
(both appear indebted to his anthropological reading of the 
Master/Slave dialectic and desire). The former approach too easily 
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slips into a crude entrenchment of religious truth claims versus 
science; the significance of the latter has already been admirably 
challenged by leading scholars such as Maurizio Meloni (2002). Nor 
is it my intention to highlight the various ways in which Girard 
misconstrues Lacan's work, attacking a straw man as it were, with 
view to redrawing the potential for their relationship. Rather, taking 
the twin themes of sacrifice and the sexual relation my aim is first: to 
interrogate the modalities of mimesis and sacrifice according the 
Lacan's three registers of the psyche: the imaginary, symbolic, and 
real; second: I explore Girard's distinction between myth and Gospel 
in the light of Lacan's claim regarding the impossibility of the sexual 
relation. Everything hinges on – to employ Lacan's terminology – the 
"real" of sacrifice. If my reading is correct, then the difference 
between sacrifice in the register of the symbolic, and sacrifice in the 
register of the real does not merely conform to Girard's distinction 
between myth and gospel, it reintroduces the sexual question refuted 
by Girard. 
 
Girard: Violence and the Scapegoat 
 
Girard makes the argument for a universal anthropological theory 
of violence and sacrifice to which the Gospels offer an exceptional 
alternative. Beginning with violence and aggression, Girard argued 
that these can be traced back to the mimetic character of desire: we 
desire objects not for their intrinsic value as such, but because they are 
themselves desired by others. Conflict subsequently arises out of the 
inevitable rivalry that competition for the object generates: the war of 
all against all. The circumstances impose a double-bind upon the 
subject, a contradictory double imperative because "man cannot 
respond to that universal human injunction 'Imitate me!' without 
almost immediately encountering an inexplicable counter order 'Don't 
imitate me!'" (Girard, 2005a: 156). The double bind accounts for the 
self-perpetuating nature of the process: where someone desires and 
encounters the obstacle of conflicting desires, the very rebuff 
strengthens the resolve of desire. And by a "mental shortcut" (Ibid.: 
157) violence is seen as a distinctive attribute of the goal, and thus 
violence and desire become inevitably linked. Violence becomes "the 
signifier of ultimate desire, of divine self-sufficiency, of that 'beautiful 
totality' whose beauty depends on its being inaccessible and 
impenetrable" (Ibid.: 156). 
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Murderous violence is only averted through a scapegoat 
mechanism. A sacrificial victim must be found, a nodal point around 
which the group can coalesce, to focus their collective envy. The 
death of the scapegoat placates the aggression and provides a channel 
of release which re-establishes the social bond. And because the 
scapegoat subsequently restores social harmony, the victim takes on 
the aura of sanctity. In this way the scapegoat is said to suffer a double 
transference, loathed in the act of expulsion, only to be subsequently 
exalted.  
However, the mechanism of the scapegoat is characteristically 
obscured – the basis of all mythological thinking, because the 
scapegoat is a substitute victim, not chosen for any intrinsic quality as 
such, but simply as a substitute. This re-doubling or surrogacy not 
only obscures the murderous quality of all human desire, it forms the 
basis of all ritual action: To sacrifice or scapegoat is to practice the 
model form of religion.  
Now, given Girard's anthropological standpoint, it would be easy to 
read the Gospels according to a similar logic: Christ is the scapegoat, 
the innocent victim who must pay the price of sin, i.e. be cast out to 
ensure human solidarity. Moreover, like the scapegoat, Christ 
experiences the double transference of the crowd: initially vilified he 
is then heralded as a savior for resolving the mimetic crisis. However, 
what is really radical about Girard is that he rejects the whole edifice 
of sacrifice, including its psychoanalytic variation, on the basis of the 
Hebrew Scriptures and the Gospels. According to Girard, the bible 
texts, and especially the New Testament does away with sacrifice by 
exposing the founding mechanism of society: "The real meaning and 
function of the Passion" is "one of subverting sacrifice and barring it 
from working ever again by forcing the founding mechanism out into 
the open, writing it down in the text of all the Gospels" (Girard, 
2005b: 181). Christ has no place in support of a violent revolution. 
God is defeated by violence on the cross because violence has no 
place in God's Kingdom; i.e., the two are mutually exclusive, they 
cannot occupy the same space. Hence Christ met violence and 
suffering without retaliation, but forgiveness. Christ's sacrifice is 
therefore an exception to the rule, a sacrifice in which the very notion 
of sacrifice is brought into question (i.e., the sacrifice of sacrifice) 
(Williams, 2001: 18). Hence to say Christ's death was a sacrifice only 
makes sense when what is sacrificed is sacrifice itself. And for this 
reason Girard claims that the opposition between violence and non-
violence is repeated in the distinction between myth and Gospel. Myth 
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refers principally to a story which occludes the mechanism of violence 
through the scapegoat; Gospel exposes the violence of the mechanism. 
 
Girard and Psychoanalysis 
 
From the outset one should note the antipathy that arises in Girard's 
work towards psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Lacanian. It's not 
that Girard simply rejects Freud; on the contrary, he praises Freud for 
coming close to apprehending the role mimetic desire plays in 
conflict. The problem arises because Freud's mimetic intuitions are 
"incompletely formulated" (Ibid.: 227). For example, Freud's early 
formulations of the Oedipal complex show intimations of mimetic 
desire (e.g., in his discussion of identification in Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego Freud says – "A little boy will exhibit a 
special interest in his father; he would like to grow and be like him" 
(Freud, 1921c: 105)). Yet in his later work this mimetic account gives 
way to a "desire that is fundamentally directed toward an object" 
(Williams, 2001: 226). Hence in The Ego and the Id, Freud says: "At a 
very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his 
mother…; the boy deals with his father by identifying himself with 
him" (Freud, 1923b: 31-32). In short, where Freud initially insisted on 
the anteriority of identification, the later texts – while not repudiating 
its role – suggest that the son's sexual attraction to the mother is prior. 
The result: by grounding desire in an object-cathexis, Freud was able 
to persuade himself that the parricide-incest desire actually exists, 
relegating the mimetic effect for the super-ego.  
Girard is not denying the attribution to the child of libidinal desire 
as such; rather, his claim is that the child is unaware of existing 
rivalry: the incest wish, the parricide wish, do not belong to the child, 
but spring from the mind of the adult, just as it is the Oracle that puts 
the idea into the head of Laius. The preference for object-cathexis 
merely masks the explanatory power of mimetic rivalry as the cause 
of social dis-ease and hence constitutes in Girardian terms the 
mythical element of Freudian thought (Williams, 2001: 233-234). 
By way of an example we can read the myth of Oedipus from a 
Girardian perspective? When Thebes suffers pestilence and drought 
the cause is put down to Oedipus' sexual misdemeanor. Hence, in the 
manner of a scapegoat Oedipus is violently expelled from Thebes as 
the condition of social harmony. Yet the narrative also suggests that 
the cause was an arbitrary act of nature: pestilence; i.e., a cause that 
could not be supported by reference to a big Other. The expulsion of 
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Oedipus and revival of Thebes's fortunes merely confirms the system 
of sacrificial violence. And by maintaining the primacy of the 
sacrificial system, it maintains the myth that sex and not death is the 
real problem (Girard, 2005a: 188).  
According to Girard, the trajectory of Freud's mythical occlusion of 
mimetic desire is especially compounded by Lacan's structural 
linguistic rendering of Freud. Lacan's psychoanalytic heritage leads 
him to fetishize the mimetic object by interpreting it in a unilaterally 
sexual fashion, and this is further reinforced through the structural 
aspects of his work leading to an "inertia and a-temporality of 
structure" (Williams, 2001: 242). In the final analysis Girard believes 
that Lacan's work will have a "numbing effect and inevitably lead to a 
sort of absolute skepticism that we can see spreading everywhere" 
(Girard, 2005b: 423). Indeed, the mythical element of Lacan's work is 
aptly highlighted by his preference for associating the violence of the 
real with "the dark god" (Lacan, 1998 [1964]: 275). Lacan's deity still 
contains vestiges of sacralized violence. 
 
Lacan and Sacrifice 
 
On the surface Girard's thought leaves little room the practice of 
psychoanalysis. By eliminating the conscious patricide-incest desire, 
Girard not only does away with the sexual bias, but also "the 
cumbersome necessity of the desire's subsequent repression. In fact it 
does away with the unconscious" (Williams, 2001: 241). However, in 
Enjoy Your Symptom, Žižek establishes the link between Girard's 
thesis and Lacan precisely at the level of sacrifice (Žižek, 2001: 56). 
How then are we to understand this relation? My aim here is less to 
provide a critical reading of those texts in which Lacan explicitly 
treats sacrifice, but rather read sacrifice, through Lacan's three 
registers of the psyche: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. 
 
Imaginary Sacrifice 
 
When the imaginary order determines sacrifice, sacrifice functions 
to give body to the Other. Sacrifice is concerned with domesticating 
the trauma of real which threatens to break in at any moment through 
an act of identification – or in Girardian terms mimesis. In short, the 
imaginary register, sacrifice posits and seeks to achieve a 
transcendental harmony or identity as a defensive measure. As 
Richard Boothby points out, the imaginary aspect of sacrifice is 
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vividly manifest in the Greek tradition which favored the sacrifice of 
an animal without blemish (Boothby, 2001: 183). This imaginary 
function to sacrifice is highlighted by both Žižek and Adrian Johnson: 
"Sacrifice conceals the abyss of the Other's desire, more precisely: it 
conceals the Other's lack, inconsistency […]. Sacrifice is a guarantee 
that 'the Other exists': that there is an Other who can be appeased by 
means of the sacrifice" (Žižek, 2001: 56). 
Sacrifice is not about offering an object that one knows is desired 
by another, it is not a straight forward transaction between a mortal 
and a deity, rather the function of the object is to give body to the 
mystery of what these obscure divine others want from human beings. 
To domesticate the intolerable background that is permeated by the 
threatening proximity of the unknown. The ritual background provides 
a stable imaginary/symbolic framework by which to answer the 
question of the desires of the real. Humans give the gods things to 
create the calming illusion of their being determinate wants in the 
gods that can be satiated (the imaginary phallus) that which the child 
latches onto in symbolizing what the other wants (Johnston, 2001). 
Said otherwise, sacrifice follows the logic of castration: Pars Pro 
Toto: the part for the whole: an object is ceded in the hope of securing 
(the imaginary) whole (Zwart, 1998). For example, in The Book of 
Exodus, God is about to kill Moses but only dissuaded through his 
abrupt circumcision by his wife (Ex 4:24). His sacrificial act of 
circumcision, ceding his foreskin, serves to ensure the persistence of 
his being whilst at the same time giving presence to the terrifying 
God. 
All of this accords with Lacan's early view of myth, which arose 
from the encounter with Lévi-Strauss which marked Lacan's early 
phase. Where for Lévi-Strauss myth was a rigorous mode of thought 
for resolving the central contradictions of existence – putting it on a 
par with scientific reasoning – Lacan took an altogether negative 
view. He named the specificity of that contradiction in terms of the 
impossibility of the sexual relation, and myths function as "a kind of 
mask" (Lacan, 2007 [1969-1970]: 121). The objective of myth was in 
the words of Russell Grigg, "a way of papering over the impossible, 
real kernel around which the myth is constructed" (Grigg, 2006: 55). 
One might say that myths function in much the same way as they do 
for Girard, albeit that for Girard it is specifically the victimage 
mechanism that is obscured.  
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Viewed from the imaginary register, religious sacrifice cannot but 
appear as it was for Freud: a defense against the real of nature, a social 
form of neurosis.  
 
Symbolic Sacrifice 
 
When the symbolic order determines sacrifice, sacrifice concerns 
less the occlusion of the anxiety provoking real, as the establishment 
of signification. This is the basis of Lacan's reading of the Akheida in 
his "Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar". Commenting 
on Caravaggio's The Sacrifice of Isaac (1595-1600) he says: "Here 
may be marked the knife blade separating God's bliss from what in 
that tradition is presented as his desire" (Lacan, 1990 [1973]: 94). The 
cut of Abraham's knife amounts to the cut induced by the signifier, 
which determines the subject and brings the differential system of 
signification into play.  
To highlight this point, one may translate Lacan's mirror stage 
(governed by the imaginary) and its dissolution into the symbolic 
directly into Girardese: In the life of a civilization the fragmentary 
body which proceeds identification with the specular image – Lacan's 
mirror stage – corresponds to the initial lack of social differentiation 
which brings on the mimetic crisis or aggression that precedes the 
formation of any 'social contract' or symbolic order. The mirror image 
is the monstrous double, the surrogate victim who promises to bring 
wholeness by standing in for the community as a whole. It is thus 
synonymous with the imaginary phallus, which is nothing but the 
imaginary "I" whose sacrifice gives birth to the ego ideal. Through the 
murder of the monstrous double the war of all against all is 
transformed into the unanimous violence of all against one which 
establishes the differential system of the social order. This is the origin 
of monarchy, government, and the big Other, or the exception which 
grounds the law and organizes desire. The function of the symbolic 
rituals and prohibitions is to maintain the differences which prevent 
society from descending into mimetic rivalry and reciprocal violence. 
Alienation sets in when the impact of the founding murder has 
receded into oblivion and even its ritual re-enactments have fallen into 
disuse, heralding the advent of another mimetic crisis.1  
                                                                    
1. I am grateful to Dr. Richard Johnson for the discussion of these ideas.  
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Reflecting the registers of the imaginary and real back into the 
symbolic register of sacrifice, one could say that the real corresponds 
with the sacred, an uncontrollable violence which is only averted by 
the sacrifice of the imaginary phallus – the scapegoat itself. Hence as 
Richard Boothby says, sacrifice, like language, is situated on the pivot 
between the imaginary and symbolic, as is classically exemplified in 
the act of reading the entrails of a sacrifice animal – staging the 
transition from nature to culture. Sacrifice, like castration, establishes 
the operations of the signifier and hence is "the gateway through 
which the subject comes to language" (Boothby, 2001: 183). 
Viewed from the symbolic register, Lacan's view of sacrifice sits 
neatly with Girard: Sacrifice is the birth of religion and hence culture; 
Durkheim's defense of religion.  
 
Real Sacrifice 
 
All of this brings us to a third account of sacrifice: Sacrifice 
governed by the register of the real, or rather, real sacrifice. If 
imaginary sacrifice aims to pacify and give body to the Other 
(propitiatory sacrifice), and symbolic sacrifices allows for the 
establishment of difference and desire in relation to the Other 
(expiatory sacrifice); real sacrifice makes the more daring move by 
bringing the Other into question, and hence the very framework in 
which propitiatory or expiatory sacrifice makes sense. Real sacrifice 
involves what Dennis Keenan (2005: 2) refers to as "aneconomical 
understanding" in which what is sacrificed is sacrifice itself. And 
herein lies the link initially established by Žižek Enjoy Your Symptom 
between Girard's and Lacan's respective projects: both advance a 
theory which refuses sacrificial logic (Žižek, 2001: 56). 
To clarify the above it is helpful to recall the "post-metaphysical" 
shift Lacan introduced into psychoanalysis. Unlike Freud who set in 
opposition his own science of psychoanalysis to religion, highlighting 
the latter's weakness precisely by virtue of its mythical foundation, 
Lacan opposed psychoanalysis to science itself, arguing that science 
still remained within the orbit of "theism" (Lacan, 1967-1968: 
21.02.68). In other words, he claimed that science, unlike 
psychoanalysis, is still too religious. What Lacan had in mind was the 
way science often, albeit implicitly, depends upon a notion of a big 
Other – be it God, Spirit, or Nature – that has a pre-existing plan of 
the cosmos of which it is the scientists task to discover (Gallagher, 
2000a: 1-22). Consider for example Stephen Hawking's question 
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"Does God play dice?" or more generally the claim that science helps 
us uncover nature's secrets. This big Other or subject supposed to 
know anticipates all our knowing such that in the end all learning, as 
Plato argued, is but a rediscovery of what is already known in the 
mind of the Creator. Said otherwise, the subject supposed to know acts 
in terms of a fundamental deadlock, securing the subject, nature, or 
the universe as whole, such that if it were to be unlocked, all other 
terms in the field of reference would lose their meaning. Lacan often 
refers to the way Descartes uses this Other – God – to guarantee the 
truth of his scientific starting point (Ibid.: 8): "Is not the sense of what 
Pascal called the 'God of philosophy' – from this reference to the 
Other so essential in Descartes, and which allowed us to start from it 
in order to secure our first step" (Lacan, 1966-1967: 25.01.67). In his 
opposition to science, Lacan took it to be the task of psychoanalysis to 
put into question this big Other (Lacan, 1967-1968: 21.02.68). 
The overtones of Heidegger's project are striking, in particular 
Heidegger's criticism that metaphysics was onto-theology; i.e., God 
was translated into the first principle [meta/beyond], Being, the causa 
sui, who sustains being as a whole. From the perspective of theology, 
God's mystery is reduced to the first cause in the chain of being 
meanwhile philosophy is relegated to epistemology: What we can 
know concerning this first cause. By bringing Heidegger's critique to 
bear upon psychoanalysis, Lacan aimed to challenge the metaphysical 
structures that sustain subjectivity by challenging the Other as its 
locus of support (Richardson, 1983: 139-160). This is one of the 
meanings of Lacan's claim: "There is no Other of the other" 
(Gallagher, 2000b: 106).  
Lacan brings the onto-theological critique to bear on 
psychoanalysis: Through the art of speaking psychoanalysis brings 
into question the transcendental moorings to which we give meaning 
to our lives. Lacan may have been less convinced than Nietzsche that 
we have overcome metaphysics in the death of God. As he says "This 
Other which is precisely the God of the philosophers is not so easy to 
eliminate as people believe. Since in reality, it undoubtedly remains 
stable at the horizon, in any case, of all our thoughts" (Lacan, 1968-
1969: 4.06.69). Nonetheless, he takes it as the task of psychoanalysis 
to provide the 'sponge', i.e., develop the clinical tools with which to 
bring into question the horizon of our thoughts. 
What is at issue for Lacan then is not so much being reconciled to 
castration à la Freud; i.e., recognizing that we cannot be the object of 
desire for the mother (symbolic sacrifice), but rather, through an 
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anxiety provoking encounter with immanence, come to recognize the 
non-existence of the Other. That is to say, come to accept that there is 
no external legislative authority that secures the system as a whole: 
the big Other through which we organize desire does not actually 
exist; what Lacan calls traversing the fantasy. In other words Lacan 
invites us to affirm the world as sufficient unto itself, what Heidegger 
referred to as the 'giveness' of Dasein. Hence, we need not "refer to 
anything outside of the world to explain the world such as forms, 
essences, or God: that the world contains its own principles of 
genesis" (Larval-Subjects, 2007). 
Viewed from the register of the real, religious sacrifice is not to be 
taken as a defensive measure (thereby implying religion is a myth to 
be swept away); nor a constitutive moment (conflating religion with 
culture more generally); real sacrifice is neither for or against religion 
as such. Rather the poles are set between the metaphysical 
presuppositions involved in the former two accounts and a 
postmetaphysical account. The imaginary aspect of sacrifice invites in 
a metaphysical hubris by assuming a transcendental totality in the 
image of wholeness that it seeks. The symbolic aspect of sacrifice 
invites in metaphysical hubris because while it affirms castration – the 
blade of Abraham – it nonetheless retains intact the supposition of 
transcendental whole from which one must separate (in much the 
same way that atheism is still at heart a theism, simply transposing the 
predicates of God into man – the two are complicit in their 
opposition). By contrast, sacrifice in the register of the real breaks 
altogether with metaphysical suppositions, traversing the fantasy of 
wholeness in the first place. In this way Lacan's account makes good 
on Girard's claim that the Gospels are completely realistic, they 
envisage perfectly "all that is implied in going beyond 'metaphysical 
closure'" (Girard, 2005b: 198): Christ's sacrifice is of the order of the 
real, freeing one from the very need to repeat the victimage 
mechanism.  
 
The Real Non-Violence of Sexual Difference 
 
Given the complicity between Girard and Lacan's view of sacrifice, 
how then are we to contend with Girard's claim that his own theory 
dispenses with the need for sexual bias? As I argue in what follows 
the difference between sacrifice in the register of the symbolic, and 
sacrifice in the register of the real is underpinned by the impossibility 
of the sexual relation. In short, does not Girard's distinction between 
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myth and gospel conform precisely to the impossibility of the sexual 
relation?  
By way of an introduction, it is worth rehearsing Lacan's approach 
to the question of sexual difference. According to Lacan, the failure of 
feminism was that it tried to claim the existence of a specifically 
feminine universal. To be equal was for women to claim their own 
rights qua the feminine. However, such an approach too readily took 
as its normative concept a belief in "eternal mother", a concept 
through which they might recognize their own true nature. The 
problem arises because this easily lapses back into an essentialist 
discourse about women in which all women are identified primarily as 
mothers. The implications for psychoanalytic practice could not be 
more problematic: analyst's tended to presuppose what a woman was 
(i.e., a mother), and this allowed the analyst to frame in advance her 
problem without taking into account the specificity of each woman as 
she came. 
Lacan's logic of sexuation tackled this essentialism head on. What 
they offer is not a list of essentialist predicates to describe in positive 
terms the distinctions between men and women (e.g., men are 
objective; women are subjective; men speculate; women feel, etc.) but 
two distinct descriptions of the antagonisms one encounters precisely 
when one tries to determine what masculinity and femininity are in the 
first place. As Lacan (1971-1972: 3.03.72) says: "The sexual 
relationship […] can no longer be written in terms of male essence 
and female essence".  
In place Lacan proposes the following two propositions to describe 
respectively the antagonism that defines the masculine and feminine 
position. On the masculine side the proposition reads:  
 There exists an x (i.e., a man) who is not subject to phallic 
jouissance;  
 All x (i.e., men) are subject to phallic jouissance.  
In other words, the antagonism that defines masculinity can be read 
as the law of exception, i.e., for every rule there is an exception which 
paradoxically grounds the rule. The most salient example of this is to 
be found in Totem and Taboo where Freud developed Darwin's myth 
of the primal father. According to Freud, men lived in relatively small 
groups within which the strongest male's jealously prevented sexual 
promiscuity by keeping all the females for himself. Hence while all 
men were subject to his phallic law, there existed one male who was 
not, yet nonetheless by which the law itself was grounded (Freud, 
1912-1913a: 125). That is to say, one can also describe the masculine 
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formula of sexuation in terms of castration: all men are castrated; 
nonetheless there is one exception that proves the rule. The exception 
has the function of the father who subsequently establishes the set of 
men, thereby allowing for a unitary trait: all men are castrated.  
By contrast the feminine proposition reads:  
 There is not one x (i.e., female) who is not subject to phallic 
jouissance;  
 Not-all x (i.e., women) are subject to phallic jouissance.  
The antagonism that defines femininity is described as the not-All 
(pas-tout). The upper line states that there is not one particular woman 
who is not subject to phallic jouissance. In other words, all women fall 
under the rule of the phallus, a claim easily discernable in the romance 
languages such as French or Italian where regardless of one's 
anatomical sex, one must use a language which takes as its normative 
the masculine. However, the second part of the formula reads: "not-All 
woman are subject to phallic jouissance". Not-all does not mean not-
at-all; i.e., that women are entirely outside of the symbolic or 
patriarchal rule. Nor is it meant to imply all-not-phallic; i.e., there is a 
universal and integral essence of woman as distinct from an essence of 
masculinity, grounding women as a set. Rather, to say that woman is 
not-All is to say precisely that there is no single exception which 
allows for a universal set of women to emerge, or, there is no unitary 
trait that functions for women in the way castration does for men: 
There are only particulars, and hence each woman is an exception. In 
short, woman is only ever singular and henceforth the very principle 
of difference.  
So how does this conform to the logic of myth and Gospel? First, 
one can readily associate the masculine logic of castration with 
metaphysics; i.e., onto-theology. For example, all men are castrated; 
nonetheless there is one exception that proves the rule. In this case, the 
father in question is God, the omnipotent and omniscient father who 
stands outside the system as a kind of transcendental placeholder, 
sustaining the system as a whole. In short, God is the exception that 
grounds the law. God cannot be reduced to the order of Being, 
because he defines the order and hence law; nonetheless, by accepting 
castration (i.e., symbolic sacrifice) it is possible to internalize those 
predicates: man is omnipotent within the order of being. Second, by 
postulating that "there is no Other of the Other", i.e., there is no set of 
women guaranteed by a primal [m]Other, the feminine subject 
position refuses to be grounded in a violent exclusion. 
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Hence, one can replace the Lacanian claim: there is no sexual 
relation with a Girardian reworking: there is no unity between the 
violence and non-violent; the two are constituted by two mutually 
distinct antagonisms. This is not to say from Girard's Christian 
standpoint that violence has not been a defining factor in the historical 
emergence of the Church or in its continued dealings with the world; 
nor that violence is not attested to in scripture; if anything it takes 
violence absolutely seriously by raising it to the level now accorded 
sex; but rather, violence need not of itself become the presuppositional 
logic upon which a culture is founded; there is an alternative logic 
identified as the not-All, which is not predicated upon a violent act of 
exclusion. 
By way of interpretation, does not this underlying economy make 
sense of a small biographical detail surrounding Girard's conversion to 
Catholicism. Immediately following his dramatic conversion, Girard 
tells us, he took the sacrament of confession, baptized his children, 
and re-took his marriage vows. Yet, as Girard is quick to point out, his 
wife remained a protestant (Girard, 2007). In this detail we have the 
entire economy summed up: not only does he link the shift from myth 
to gospel, violence to non-violence with the sexual relation, he then 
states the very impossibility of that relationship.  
A question remains: can we think the possibility of truth without 
the gospel? The answer to that question lies with an adjacent question: 
is Lacan's approach to sacrifice and the sexual relation conceivable 
outside the Christian symbolic economy (Žižek, 1996: 177)? 
  
Conclusion 
 
In today's climate of religious fundamentalism one might be 
inclined to propagate, even evangelize, Nietzsche's "good news" over 
and against Girard (Lacan, 2007 [1969-1970]: 119): God is dead. Yet 
Girard's theory owes a debt to psychology and social theory as it does 
theology. Moreover, as Lacan recognized: "The announcement of the 
death of God is far from incompatible with the motivation for 
religion" (Ibid.: 119), and that while "the pinnacle of psychoanalysis is 
well and truly atheism", this works only to the extent one gives it 
another sense than "God is dead" (Ibid.: 119). Taken in the sense of a 
symbolic sacrifice, God's death may make for the consolidation of law 
– this is what Lacan refers to as the reverse side of psychoanalysis 
(Ibid.: 119); but both theology and psychoanalysis call for a different 
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type of sacrifice which implies an altogether different social, sexual, 
psychical, and religious configuration.  
 
 
Lacan en Girard: seks en geweldloosheid 
 
Samenvatting: In dit artikel wordt het werk van Jacques Lacan, die de psychoanalyse 
kerstende, geconfronteerd met dit van René Girard, de speculatieve antropoloog wiens 
studie van het offer en de mythe hem niet alleen leidden tot de verwerping van Freud en 
Lacan maar ook tot zijn dramatische bekering tot het katholicisme en groeiende 
overtuiging van de revelerende kracht van de evangelies om de mythe te onthullen waarop 
de psychoanalyse steunt. Ondanks hun antipathie werpt de auteur vanuit psychoanalytisch 
perspectief licht op de theorie van Girard, waarbij hij de modaliteiten van het offer 
ondervraagt volgens Lacans drie registers van het imaginaire, het symbolische en het 
reële. Vervolgens verkent hij Girards onderscheid tussen mythe en evangelie in het licht 
van Lacans stelling inzake de onmogelijkheid van de seksuele verhouding. 
Beargumenteerd wordt dat het verschil tussen het offer in het register van het symbolische 
en het offer in het register van het reële niet alleen de onmogelijkheid van de seksuele 
verhouding herneemt, maar ook overeenstemt met Girards onderscheid tussen mythe en 
evangelie. Op deze manier wordt het pad geëffend voor een meer mutuele lezing van hun 
werk en van theologie en psychoanalyse in het algemeen. 
 
Sleutelwoorden: Lacan, Girard, Seks, Geweld, Mythe, Offer. 
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